“On condition that, if any of them dies without leaving a child, his share shall pass to those of his generation,” he says:

“If the endower intended collective generality, this wording would qualify and clarify his intent. Whenever the choice is between treating this clause as an explanation of the initial wording and treating it as meaningless, interpreting it as meaningful and explanatory is preferable, for two reasons.

“First, I give it effect; giving effect to the endower’s words is preferable to disregarding them.

“Second, I treat it as clarifying wording that is then open to more than one interpretation. Through it, I exclude an interpretation upon which I would otherwise have acted. When speech admits two meanings, there are grounds for determining one of them, whether those grounds exclude the alternative or not. By interpreting this wording as explanatory, I give those grounds their due force and safeguard words that distinguish the lawful from the unlawful against being disregarded and rendered meaningless. What comparison is there between this and the approach of someone who adopts a possible meaning of the opening words, disregards their conclusion, and attributes inarticulacy and pointless speech to the speaker?”

What clarifies this is that the expression “on condition that” is a formula introducing a stipulation and a qualification. A stipulation concerns something that the contract can accommodate, although its unrestricted wording does not entail it.

To explain: saying “I have sold” and “I have purchased” does not entail a deferred payment, a pledge, a guarantor, a currency other than the local currency, or an additional quality in the item sold. Yet the wording admits these possibilities, in the sense that it is compatible with either arrangement. Left unrestricted, however, it excludes these things: the wording does not require them, and the default is their absence.

Thus, whenever he says, “On condition that you give me as security for it