or grandchild, or any progeny or descendants, his share shall pass to the members of his tier.” Thus, he made its transfer to them conditional upon the deceased leaving no child. Just as this condition excludes an interruption, it also restricts transfer to the members of that tier. The wording explicitly conveys both meanings; its conveying one does not prevent it from conveying the other.

This is like saying: “I endow it for my three children, then for the poor, on condition that whoever among them dies during the founder’s lifetime, his share shall be assigned to those of his own tier.” Would it then be permissible to assign his share to the members of his tier if he dies after the founder’s death? No one has held this in such a case. It might, however, be said that his dying after the founder’s death is left unaddressed, so that the endowment has an interruption midway.

The correct view, held in earlier times and today, is that his share passes to the poor. The wording assigns it to the three, then to the poor; whenever it is not assigned to the three, it must therefore be assigned to the poor, since the founder confined the endowment to these beneficiaries. Moreover, the argument in our case is clearer still, as explained above.

Indeed, even supposing someone had said that if he dies leaving no child there is an interruption, whereas if he dies leaving a child there is none, one could say that this condition serves to exclude the possibility of interruption. Nevertheless, it also conveys a restriction, as we have explained: it indicates that the share of someone who dies leaving no child is to be assigned to his tier, and that it is not to be assigned to them when he leaves a child. The first implication excludes interruption, while the second requires shared entitlement. There is no incompatibility between the two.