in the form of unrestricted or general terms. This is like a man examining an endowment whose founder had said, “I endow this for my children, then for their children,” and subsequently added, “One condition for the beneficiaries is that they be poor, upright in character, or the like.” The man then says, “This statement is self-contradictory, because at its beginning he endowed it for everyone, which contradicts restricting it to some.” He then treats this as a matter of “the specific and the general” and “conflicting proofs.”

It is clear that all this is confused reasoning. For a conflict presupposes that each proof independently conveys its meaning, and such independence presupposes that the statement has ended and stands separately. When, however, it remains connected to wording that changes its effect, one part cannot be treated as proof contradicting another. May Allah, glorified be He, guide us and all Muslims to what He loves and is pleased with.

If it is said: His wording, “on condition that whoever among them dies,” may be a condition stipulated by the founder to clarify that the endowment passes to those who remain and that it does not suffer an interruption midway. For some jurists have derived three opinions concerning what happens when one beneficiary dies under the stipulation, “For my children, then for my children’s children,” corresponding to the three opinions concerning the stipulation, “For my three children, then for the poor.” The first—and it is the well-known opinion—is that it belongs to the remaining members of the first tier. The second is that it passes to the second tier, as though all members of the first tier had died.