on the first oath by the qualification in the second.

But if he said, “I will not travel on foot,” his oath would, by agreement, be restricted accordingly.

Thus, when the founder says here, “I have established an endowment for my children, then their children, then their children’s children, on condition that, if any of them dies without leaving a child, his share shall pass to those of his generation,” the meaning becomes: “I have established an endowment subject to this qualification,” which provides that the deceased’s share passes to those of his generation on condition that he leaves no child.

This is comparable to saying, “I have established an endowment for my children, my children’s children, my progeny, and my descendants, on condition that the children become entitled to this endowment after their fathers’ deaths.” Would not every jurist hold that the children’s entitlement is conditional upon their fathers’ deaths? And that, had he confined himself to saying, “For my children and my children’s children,” this would have entailed their sharing in the entitlement?

This is further clarified by a case that might be thought analogous to the present one: if someone establishes an endowment for Zayd, ‘Amr, and Bakr, and then for the poor, nothing passes to the poor until all three have died. This is the well-known position.

Suppose, however, that in this case he says, “I have established an endowment for Zayd, ‘Amr, and Bakr, and then for the poor, on condition that, when any of the three dies, his share shall pass to the other two if there is no poor person in the town where the endowment is located.”

Or he says, “On condition that, if any of the three dies and no poor person is to be found, his share shall pass to the other two.”

Or he says, “On condition that, when any of the three dies, his share shall pass to the other two if they are poor,” or “if they reside in the town where the endowment is located,” and similar