And, if you wish, you may say: because it is a prepositional phrase attached to the verb, and a prepositional phrase functions as an object in negation, thereby restricting the verb.

Or, if you wish, you may say: because it is a statement that does not stand independently and must therefore be joined to what precedes it.

Or, if you wish, you may say: because the speaker did not stop at the initial statement, but joined further words to it, and that continuation restricts it. All these principles are self-evident in every language.

To explain the second premise: whenever a statement is joined to a qualifying description, a condition, or any other wording that changes what it would entail if left unrestricted, that wording must be given effect. It is impermissible to detach the statement from the qualifications joined to it. This, too, is undisputed among jurists—indeed, among all rational people.

Upon all this rest the rulings relating to the statements of legally accountable persons in matters of worship and transactions, such as endowments, bequests, acknowledgments, sales, gifts, pledges, leases, partnerships, and other matters.

Hence the jurists say: the founder’s wording determines whether an endowment is unrestricted or restricted.

Thus, if the opening words are unrestricted or general, and the speaker joins to them something that limits their scope or qualifies them, effect must be given to that qualification or limitation. If, for example, he says, “I establish an endowment for my children,” this is general. But if he adds “the poor,” “the upright,” or “the males,” the endowment is confined to them, even though his opening words were general.

No one may say: “The word ‘children’ is general, and specifically mentioning one of the two categories does not exclude the other from the ruling.” Rather, all rational people unanimously agree that he