previously mentioned. Whether it also encompasses what came afterward is doubtful, and mere doubt does not justify including it. Indeed, it may be argued:

This was originally the share of the deceased from whom it passed, as the founder stated. The founder’s wording and customary usage evidently indicate that he treated members of the same generation equally with regard to the share of someone who had a child. The other beneficiary received it because he belonged to that same generation, and his children belong to the same generation as the children of the first deceased. Just as the two deceased beneficiaries would have shared in this reallocated share had they both been alive, so their children share in it after them, for both sets of children bear the same relationship to its original holder. This is what people intend by such stipulations, as their customary usage and practice attest.

The aim is to administer the endowment according to the stipulations intended by its founder. Hence the jurists said: “His provisions are like the texts of the Lawgiver”—meaning in how they are understood and what they signify. Their intended meaning may thus be understood in various ways, just as the Lawgiver’s intent is understood. Anyone who examines the circumstances of endowment founders knows that this is what they intend, for it is more consistent with justice. The grandchildren all bear the same relationship to the founder, so he has no purpose in giving one beneficiary’s son two or three shares merely because his father died later, while the others receive only one share. This is especially so since the beneficiary who died later had already received income from the endowment and may have left his children some of that income, whereas the one who died first received only a little of it, so his children are closer to