There is no doubt that this applies where judges can and do rule with knowledge and justice without this condition. If, however, departing from that restriction would produce greater harm through ignorance and injustice than imposing it would, then this falls under averting the greater of two evils by accepting the lesser. Yet this does not entitle a founder to reserve oversight of the endowment permanently to a follower of one particular school, even where possible—unless someone from that school assumes office. How much less so when no such condition was stipulated!

For this reason, in some Muslim lands judges were required to rule only according to a particular school. In some lands, independent judges also came to be appointed, with general judicial authority throughout the territory. There is, however, well-known disagreement concerning each of these arrangements, and concerning which judge is to be designated when the two litigants disagree: should the nearest judge be designated, or should the choice be made by drawing lots? There is well-known disagreement on this. When the ruler adopts measures in these matters that admit of juristic reasoning, those measures take effect.

Accordingly, whatever school a judge follows, if his authority includes oversight of this endowment, his delegation of that oversight stands, and another judge may not overturn such a delegation—especially where entrusting it to that person serves the interests of the property and its beneficiaries in a way that entrusting it to someone else would not.

If two judges were each to appoint a different person, the ruler would be obliged to give precedence to the one more entitled to the office. For, by the consensus of the Muslims, someone whose competence and trustworthiness are known is to be preferred over someone who is not so qualified.