And likewise, someone who ransoms a captive without his permission is entitled to recover the ransom from him. The same applies to someone who pays maintenance owed by another—for example, by supporting that person’s son or wife, or feeding his livestock—especially when the person paying has a right over the livestock, as a pledgee or lessee, or has been entrusted with them as a depositary. Other examples include someone who returns a runaway slave, and one of two partners who pays for the upkeep of their jointly owned livestock.

This principle is supported by the words of Allah Most High:

“If they breastfeed for you, then give them their payment.”

He commanded that they be paid simply for breastfeeding, without stipulating a contract for their services or the father’s permission for them to breastfeed for payment. Rather, since the father is obliged to provide for his child’s nursing, a woman who nurses the child becomes entitled to payment simply by doing so.

Regarding a divorced mother, this is the position of most jurists: they hold that she becomes entitled to payment simply by breastfeeding. Abū Hanīfa also holds this view concerning the mother, although he does not hold that someone who pays another person’s debt is entitled to reimbursement. His two disciples disagreed with him.

One who distinguishes between the two cases argues: “A mother has a greater right than anyone else to breastfeed her son. Even if she asks to breastfeed for payment, she takes precedence over a woman who offers to do so gratuitously.”

The response is: “Likewise, someone who has a right over another person’s livestock, such as a lessee or pledgee, is entitled to demand that the owner provide for their upkeep. Such a person has an even stronger claim than the mother has to breastfeed.”

Furthermore, being entitled to payment under a contract of exchange does not necessarily entail being entitled to it without a contract, unless the father is obliged to provide for the nursing. And if he only