or bribery or some other means, he has wronged those from whom his own share is collected. This is not the same as protecting oneself from injustice without wronging anyone else, which is permissible—for example, refusing to pay one’s share when it will then be collected neither from oneself nor from anyone else.

This is the case with governmental levies imposed on villages. For example, ten thousand dirhams may be imposed upon them, and someone with influence through a position of command, a position as a shaykh, bribery, or some other means asks that nothing be collected from him, although the collectors are bound to collect the entire sum. If he does this, his share is collected from all the others who share the liability: he refuses to pay what falls to him, and it is collected from the others instead. This is an injustice on his part towards them, for he has only protected himself from injustice by wronging them, and this is impermissible.

He cannot say, “I did not wrong them; rather, the one who collected both shares from them wronged them.” The reply is as follows:

First: The collector may have been ordered by his superior to collect that sum, so he cannot waive one person’s share without collecting it from another instead. Thus, instructing him not to collect one’s share amounts to instructing him to commit injustice.

Second: Even supposing that he is the highest authority issuing the orders, he must treat them justly in what he demands from them. Although the demand itself is unjust, he must apportion this injustice fairly among them and not commit a further injustice in doing so, thereby compounding the injustice. For if one person’s share is one hundred and he is required to pay two hundred, he has suffered a compounded injustice, unlike when