also becomes his liability upon taking possession under the other, except that here he is liable for the stipulated price, whereas there he is liable for its equivalent value. This is a powerful argument from which there is no escape: if he treats those parts that have not yet been created as having been taken into possession, he must hold the purchaser liable under an invalid contract. If he treats them as not having been taken into possession, he must hold that the purchaser is not liable under a valid contract. The former is unquestionably false, contrary to the revealed text and scholarly consensus.

Those scholars of Kūfa who say that the contract covers only what already exists, which is what has been taken into possession, avoid this contradiction. Their position, however, necessarily contradicts the widely transmitted texts, the practice of Muslims past and present, established principles, and the justice by which heaven and earth are upheld, as explained in its proper place. This amounts to conclusive proof that relief for losses caused by calamities must be granted under both valid and invalid contracts; the case for granting it under an invalid contract is even stronger.

If, however, we regard the guarantee arrangement as valid, we hold that relief for losses caused by calamities applies to it, just as it applies to a purchase—indeed, with even greater reason. But someone who accepts this legal stratagem and regards the contract as valid may say: “You are a cultivator under a fruit-sharing contract, and no relief for losses caused by calamities applies to such contracts.” The issue thus turns on whether such relief applies to fruit-sharing contracts.