he rescinds the contract, the seller is entitled to seek compensation from the person who destroyed the property, while the buyer may reclaim the purchase price from the seller if the latter has received it. If he does not rescind it, he remains liable for the purchase price and may seek compensation from the person who destroyed the property. However, that person is liable only for the compensation due for its destruction, whereas the buyer may claim only the stipulated price due under the contract.

For this reason, the jurists of our school and others have stated:

The property may be destroyed by the seller, the buyer, or a third party, or it may perish through an act of God. If the buyer destroys it, his destruction of it is equivalent to taking possession, and his obligation to pay the consideration becomes binding. If it perishes through an act of God, the contract becomes void. If a third party destroys it, the buyer has the choice. If the seller destroys it, the more widely held of the two views treats this like destruction by a third party; the second treats it like loss through an act of God. This principle is firmly established in all contracts of exchange: if the subject matter of the contract perishes before possession can be taken, with no one liable for the loss, the contract becomes void. If someone is liable, there is a choice whether to uphold or rescind the contract.

The same applies to all other circumstances in which the purpose of the contract cannot be fulfilled, though hope of fulfilment remains. Examples include someone wrongfully seizing the property sold or leased; the seller becoming insolvent with respect to the purchase price; a wife being unable to obtain the maintenance, marital intimacy, or allotted time with her husband to which she is entitled; or a husband being unable to obtain the marital intimacy and similar rights to which he is entitled.

This principle is not contradicted by the death of either spouse, for that marks the completion and endpoint of the contract. Nor is it contradicted by divorce before consummation, because the very establishment of the bond between the spouses is one of the contract’s two objectives. Hence this bond establishes the marriage prohibitions arising from affinity, except in the case of a stepdaughter.