after taking possession of it. As for Abū Hanīfah, his position is that leaving the fruit on the trees is neither entailed by the contract nor permissible to stipulate.

Those who hold the first view say that taking possession of this fruit is comparable to taking possession of the benefit under a lease: it is not complete possession that transfers liability for loss, because the recipient has not yet been able to obtain what the contract is intended to provide.

This consistently applies their principle that what matters is the ability to obtain what the contract is intended to provide. Hence, they say that if the purchaser neglects to gather the fruit after it has fully ripened, and it consequently perishes, he bears the loss, just as he would if he neglected to take possession of a specifically identified item until it perished. This distinction has a clear and operative rationale: if the seller has not neglected any of his obligations, and the negligence is solely the purchaser’s, it is more fitting to place liability for loss upon the negligent party than upon someone who has fulfilled his obligations without negligence.

For this reason, they agree on the corresponding ruling concerning leases: if the lessee neglects to make use of the benefits until they are lost, he bears the loss. If they are lost without negligence on his part, the lessor bears the loss. Likewise, if a calamity prevents the lessee from cultivating the land, no rent is due from him. If, however, the crop grows and then a natural calamity strikes before it can be harvested, there is disagreement.

Those who distinguish this case from that of fruit and leased benefits argue that the fruit itself is the subject of the contract, as is the benefit in a lease. Here, however, the crop is not the subject of the contract; rather, it is the benefit, which the lessee has already received in full.

Those who treat the two cases alike argue that the purpose of the lease is the crop, so if