he sow it in the land, whether he is a cultivator or a tenant. It is thus as though he leased him land, supplying the means to cultivate it, for the stipulated rent. When the lease expires, he recovers the land; the cultivation advance is analogous to this. Scholars disagree about this arrangement.

Some say:

The benefit here is shared by the lender and the borrower, for the lender has an interest in having his land cultivated. This resembles a “suftaja,” whereby someone lends money in one town to receive repayment in another: the lender avoids the risks of the journey and the expense of transporting the money, while the borrower benefits from the loan. Likewise, with the “cultivation advance,” the provider does not intend to obtain an increase over what he advanced. Rather, he needs to lease out his land, and the other party needs to rent it. The arrangement can only serve its purpose fully if the lessor provides an advance to meet the tenant’s need. In reality, the purpose of the advance is not lending, but supplying him with seed, just as he might supply him with cattle.

Others classify it as a loan that brings a benefit. The cultivation advance merely completes the benefit derived from the land, just as when cattle are supplied with the land for ploughing, so that he has leased out both land and cattle. This is undoubtedly permissible. However, the advance itself does not remain intact; instead, he recovers its equivalent, just as the equivalent of the capital is recovered in a profit-sharing partnership. This is why those scholars who prohibit the arrangement have prohibited it: in a lease, the very same asset is returned to the lessor after the tenant has enjoyed its use. Something of this kind is not permissible in