The majority of our school’s jurists and of scholars generally require a substitute for the stipulated dower—its equivalent in kind or its value—not compensation for marital intimacy. This is unquestionably correct, because the marriage contract here is not invalid, so restitution of the entitlement it confers—marital intimacy—is not required. Since restitution of marital intimacy is not required, neither is compensation for it. Rather, what is required is payment of the stipulated dower if possible, or otherwise its substitute. Thus, it is the substitute for the stipulated dower that is owed, and this is closer to what the parties agreed upon than compensation for marital intimacy. In other contracts, however, invalidity requires restitution of the property itself or its substitute.

The apparent meaning of Ahmad’s statements is that, in partnership arrangements—such as profit-sharing investment contracts and similar arrangements—the stipulated consideration is likewise owed, just as in an invalid marriage contract according to the apparent position of our school. This view is stronger. Indeed, the correct position is that the value of the property or benefit is not invariably payable under an invalid contract. For if the property itself or its equivalent in kind could be returned, that would be obligatory: once the contract is rendered ineffective, every entitlement must be restored to its rightful holder, and an equivalent in kind takes the place of the property itself.

But where the entitlement can no longer be restored—as with intercourse in an invalid marriage, work performed under hiring or profit-sharing investment contracts, or loss through unfair pricing in a sale—its monetary value is not an equivalent in kind. Payment of value is required only in certain cases, such as destroyed or usurped property for which an equivalent in kind cannot be obtained. This is a matter of necessity, since nothing closer to the entitlement than its value is available. That, therefore, is the justice that can be achieved, just as we have made a similar point concerning retribution in kind