believed that this was a right attached to the property which could not lawfully be removed, and matters then proved otherwise, this constitutes a defect.

If he built on the property before learning of the defect, and subsequently discovered it, he is entitled only to compensation for the defect, not to return the property, according to one of the two scholarly views. This is the view of Abū Hanīfah and of Ahmad according to the more authoritative of the two reports from him. According to the other report—which is also Mālik’s view—he likewise may not return it, and he becomes a co-owner with the seller to the extent of the improvements he has made to it. He cannot be required to demolish them without compensation, since he built them lawfully.

According to the majority of scholars, the option to return property because of a defect need not be exercised immediately. This includes Mālik and, according to the apparent position of their respective schools, Abū Hanīfah and Ahmad. The latter two also have another view, corresponding to al-Shāfiʿī’s position, that it must be exercised immediately. If, however, the buyer says or does anything indicating acceptance, his option lapses by agreement. Thus, if he builds after learning of the defect, his option lapses.

If, however, he has witnesses attest to his claim for compensation, he is entitled to it and may demand it later. His dealings with the property do not extinguish his entitlement to compensation.

The seller may be held liable for compensation for the defect or for taking back the property insofar as he sold property of his own. As for property he sold on behalf of his principal, if he did not name his principal in the sale, he may likewise be held liable for the property sold. If he did name him, may a claim be brought against the agent, and is he responsible for the warranty obligations relating to the property sold? Scholars hold two views on this, both reported from Ahmad.