Scholars hold two views on whether designating particular dirhams in contracts and when taking possession—including usurpation and safekeeping—establishes a claim to those specific coins.

One view is that it does so in all cases. This is the position of al-Shāfi‘ī and of Ahmad according to one of the two reports from him. Another view is that it does not do so in any case, as Ibn Qāsim held. A further view is that it does so in cases of usurpation and safekeeping, but not in contracts. This is the position of Abū Hanīfah and of Ahmad according to the other report.

If usurped property is mixed with similar property so that the two cannot be distinguished—as oils, milk, grains, and other things may be mixed—is this mixing equivalent to destruction, so that the wronged party’s claim remains a debt owed by the wrongdoer, who may repay him from whatever source he chooses? Or does his claim remain attached to the property itself, entitling him to take his share of the mixture through division? There are two views on this within the schools of al-Shāfi‘ī and Ahmad.

It is clear that those excess dirhams were not specifically designated, whether he purchased from him dirhams payable as a debt or a benefit. For what was taken from the wronged party was the amount exceeding the equivalent value, not specifically designated coins. Even if the coins had been specifically designated and were then mixed with others indistinguishably, his claim to those particular coins would lapse according to one of the two views. How much more so, then, if they had not been specifically designated in the first place? Thus, according to many scholars, his claim is only a debt owed by the wrongdoer.

This is analogous to the view that, if an investment manager or a custodian dies without identifying the property held for safekeeping or the investment capital, it becomes a debt owed by him. Those who hold this view do not recognize the owner as having a claim to the specific assets of the estate. The custodian’s negligence in failing to distinguish the deposit from other property makes him liable for it. Yet these scholars regard the owner’s claim to the deceased’s specific property as having lapsed, and therefore did not