according to most of them, including Abū Hanīfah, al-Shāfi‘ī, and Ahmad. A man may also own pledged property and be responsible for its upkeep, yet have no right to dispose of it in any way that extinguishes the pledgee’s right, whether by sale or gift. There is a well-known disagreement concerning emancipation.

As for a slave whom one has vowed to emancipate, a sacrificial offering, specific property that one has vowed to give in charity, and similar things that must be devoted to a devotional purpose, jurists of our school and others have disagreed over whether this causes one’s ownership to cease. Neither position fits the model of unrestricted ownership.

Those who maintain that his ownership has not ceased—as most jurists of our school may hold—regard it as ownership that permits him to devote the property only to the designated purpose: emancipation, sacrifice, or charity. This is analogous to a slave purchased on condition that he be emancipated, given in charity, or given as a gift to maintain ties, or to a compensatory offering purchased on condition that it be sent to the Sacred Precinct.

Those who maintain that his ownership has ceased nevertheless hold that he retains the right to emancipate it, send it as an offering, or give it in charity. This, too, differs from the ordinary consequences of ownership ceasing in other circumstances.

Likewise, jurists disagree concerning an endowment for a specified beneficiary: does the endowed property become Allah’s property, pass into the beneficiary’s ownership, or remain the property of the person who established the endowment? These are three positions within the school of Ahmad and elsewhere.

Whichever position is adopted, the ownership described here is a distinct kind, unlike ownership in sales and gifts. Likewise, the recipient’s ownership of a gift, where the donor is entitled to revoke it