no countervailing evidence exists cannot make its implication probable. If it is considered likely that no countervailing evidence exists, then its implication is likewise considered probable. For most general texts, later scholars can attain this degree of probability only after searching for countervailing evidence. This applies whether one regards the absence of countervailing evidence as part of the proof itself—in which case the proof is the apparent meaning unaccompanied by any contrary contextual indication, as held by those among our fellow scholars and others who do not allow exceptions to either a proof or an effective legal cause—or regards countervailing evidence as an impediment to the proof’s operation. On the latter view, the proof is the apparent meaning itself, but the contextual indication prevents it from establishing its implication, as held by those among our fellow scholars and others who allow exceptions to a proof and an effective legal cause. The disagreement here, however, concerns only a conceptual distinction, a choice of wording, or a convention of scholarly debate; it has no bearing on any substantive scholarly or legal question.

Accordingly, the evidence negating the prohibition of contracts and conditions and affirming their permissibility is qualified by all the contracts and conditions that Allah and His Messenger have forbidden. This principle therefore cannot be usefully applied to particular categories of questions without knowledge of the evidence specific to that category. It thus more closely resembles the principles of jurisprudence—which concern general evidence—than legal maxims, which express general rulings. Nevertheless, a jurist who considers it likely that no countervailing evidence exists concerning a disputed or newly arising question may benefit from this principle. We shall therefore set out general legal rules for some of the categories it encompasses.