the individual’s act. When the individual undoes it, he merely undoes what he himself established through his own act, not the general ruling established by Allah. For the particular ruling established by Allah merely follows the individual’s act as its cause; the Lawgiver did not establish it independently. Some people have mistakenly supposed that extinguishing rights through contracts and their dissolution is like abrogating rulings. This is not so: a general ruling can be removed only by the One who established it, namely, the Lawgiver. This particular legal effect, however, arose only because the individual brought the case within the scope of the general ruling. Just as bringing it within that scope is up to him, so too is removing it.

For the Lawgiver has never prescribed a ruling for him concerning the particular item itself, such as saying: “Sell this garment,” “Do not sell it,” “Give it away,” or “Do not give it away.” Rather, He has prescribed a general ruling that applies to a particular case once that case is brought within its scope. Reflect on this: there is a distinction between changing the specific ruling that the individual established by bringing a case within the scope of the general ruling, and changing the general ruling established by the Lawgiver when the individual brings about its cause.

Once it is clear that no contracts are forbidden except those forbidden by the Lawgiver, the obligation to fulfil them follows from the Lawgiver’s general command to fulfil them, except where specific evidence establishes an exception. Moreover, fulfilling contracts is among the obligations upon which all religious traditions—indeed, all rational people—agree. Those who hold that reason establishes obligations have included their fulfilment among rational obligations. Thus, entering into contracts in the first place is not forbidden unless the Lawgiver forbids it, while fulfilling them is obligatory by the Lawgiver’s command and also by the dictates of reason.