and contracts, the discharge of trusts, and due observance of all these obligations; they also prohibit treachery, the breaking of covenants, and betrayal, and sternly condemn those who commit such acts.

On the premise that the basic rule concerning these matters is prohibition and invalidity, except for what the revealed law permits, it would not be permissible for it to command them without qualification and unreservedly condemn those who break them and act treacherously. Likewise, since taking human life is prohibited in principle, except where the revealed law permits or requires it, there can be no unrestricted command to take human lives, interpreted as applying only to permissible cases. This differs from acts that are obligatory as a category, such as prayer and zakāh: these are commanded without qualification, even though they have conditions and impediments. Thus, prayer without ritual purification is prohibited, as is giving charity in a manner that harms oneself, and similar acts. Likewise, truthfulness in speech is commanded, although particular circumstances may sometimes make it forbidden to speak the truth, requiring silence or indirect speech instead.

Since fulfilment and the observance of covenants are commanded as a category, it follows that contracts and conditions are valid in principle. For declaring a contract valid means nothing other than that it produces its intended effects and achieves its purpose. The purpose of a contract is its fulfilment. Thus, the Lawgiver’s command to fulfil the purpose of covenants indicates that validity and permissibility are the basic rule concerning them.

Abū Dāwūd and al-Dāraqutnī narrated through Sulaymān ibn Bilāl, who said: Kathīr ibn Zayd narrated to us, from al-Walīd ibn Rabāh, from Abū Hurayrah, who said: