and subsequently rules that leasing land in return for one-third of the crop is permissible, citing the sharecropping arrangement at Khaybar, he must have understood that the cultivators at Khaybar supplied the seed; otherwise, his argument would not be valid.

If we suppose that Ahmad distinguished between leasing land in return for a share of its produce and sharecropping in which the cultivator supplies the seed—as some of his followers did—this distinction has no basis in Islamic law. Ahmad does not hold that the rulings governing contracts change merely because their wording differs. Some of his followers, however, do hold this view: they permit this transaction when expressed as a lease but prohibit it when expressed as sharecropping. Likewise, they permit the sale of goods owed by the seller for immediate delivery when expressed as a sale, but prohibit it when expressed as salam (an advance-payment sale), because it then becomes a salam sale with immediate delivery.

Ahmad’s explicit rulings and underlying principles preclude this, as we have already shown when discussing his position on contractual formulas. In all legal acts effected through words, what counts is their meaning, not what is read into their wording. His answers concerning oaths, vows, bequests, and other legal acts bear this out. Even if he himself distinguished between the two arrangements, as some of his followers did, this distinction would constitute a less well-supported report from him, like the report prohibiting both arrangements.

The evidence that this is permissible comes from the Sunnah, scholarly consensus, and analogical reasoning.

As for the Sunnah, there is the previously mentioned arrangement that the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, made with the people of Khaybar: they were to cultivate the land using their own resources, and he supplied them with no seed. Likewise, the Ansār made an arrangement with the Emigrants on the condition that they supply the seed. Harb al-Kirmānī said: