those who distinguish between a lease and sharecropping—is as weak as, or weaker than, the view that equates a lease in the strict sense with sharecropping.

As for the explanation of Ahmad’s explicit ruling: he permitted leasing land in return for a share of the crop on the strength of the Prophet’s dealings with the people of Khaybar, peace and blessings be upon him. That arrangement was sharecropping; it was not expressed in the language of a lease. It is inconceivable that Ahmad would permit what the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, did only when it was called a lease, yet prohibit it when described by its familiar name. Moreover, it is established in the Sahīh:

“The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, stipulated that the people of Khaybar cultivate the land using their own resources.”

As mentioned earlier, the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, did not supply them with seed. If, under the arrangement he made, they supplied the seed from their own resources, how could Ahmad cite this as evidence for sharecropping, then extend it by analogy to an arrangement expressed as a lease, only to prohibit the very precedent he cited—sharecropping in which the cultivator supplied the seed? Furthermore, the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said to the Jews:

“We shall allow you to remain there for as long as Allah allows you to remain.”

He stipulated no fixed term that would warrant calling it a binding lease.

However, when Ahmad stated—in one of the two reports from him—that the landowner must supply the seed, he was following those who required this by analogy with mudāraba. When a scholar issues a ruling on the strength of an argument against which there is a stronger counterargument, without having that counterargument in mind at the time