in the broad sense, namely a reward contract, then, if the consideration is guaranteed—whether a particular asset or a debt—it must be specified. But if the consideration comes from what the work produces, it may be an undivided share of those proceeds. This is like a commander saying during a military campaign: “Whoever guides us to such-and-such a fortress will receive such-and-such a share of it.” Here, receiving the reward is conditional upon obtaining the property, even though this is purely a reward contract, with no partnership involved. Such an arrangement is therefore all the more permissible in a partnership.

Another line of argument may also be pursued here. It may be said: analogical reasoning from established rulings indicates that, in hiring in its restricted sense, the consideration must not involve uncertainty, by analogy with the sale price. As for hiring in the broad sense, in which the benefit need not be specified, it does not resemble this restricted form, for the reasons already given. It therefore cannot be assimilated to it by analogy, and remains subject to the basic presumption of permissibility.

The issue may thus be stated precisely: anyone who regards these arrangements as ijārah should be asked what he means by ijārah. If he means it in the restricted sense, that characterization is incorrect. If he means it in the broad sense, where is the evidence that it is prohibited unless the consideration is specified? If he adduces an analogy, the distinction should be explained to him—a distinction obvious even to a non-jurist, let alone a jurist. He will find no basis that encompasses this kind of ijārah. Once evidence of prohibition is absent, permissibility is established.

Another approach may also be pursued here: inverse analogy, which consists in