crop grows, the landowner has not taken the benefit of the other party’s labour: he has neither received that benefit nor acquired it under the contract, nor is it the intended object of the arrangement. Rather, the benefit of one party’s labour has been lost, just as the benefit of the other’s land has been lost. The landowner has received nothing, so it cannot be said that he has taken something while the other party has received nothing. This differs from sales and contracts of hire involving uncertainty, in which one party receives something while the other remains exposed to risk, leading to regret on one side and a dispute between them. This consideration does not apply to these partnerships, which rest on complete equity and involve no injustice whatsoever, whether uncertainty is present or not.

Anyone who reflects on this will understand the basis of these principles and recognize that permitting these arrangements accords more closely with the principles of the Sharia, is more readily accepted by reason, and is further removed from anything objectionable than permitting the leasing of land—or indeed many sales and contracts of hire whose permissibility is unanimously agreed upon. These arrangements bring people unalloyed benefit without harm.

The confusion among our fellow jurists who prohibited these arrangements arose, following their understanding of the transmitted reports, from their belief that these were contracts of hire for unspecified work, since they involve work in return for compensation.

Yet not everyone who works to benefit from his work is a hired worker. Examples include two partners working with jointly owned wealth, two partners working in a joint-labour partnership, and combatants sharing in the spoils of war, along with countless similar cases. Certainly, if one party were working in return for a payment guaranteed to him by the other, rather than one generated by his work, this would be a contract of hire.