If, alongside residence, the purpose is to trade in the fruit, and its value exceeds that of the residential benefit, prohibition is more justified here than in the preceding case, as reflected in the distinction drawn by Mālik and Ahmad.

If the purpose is residence and eating the fruit, this resembles seeking residence and drinking water from the well. Even if the fruit consumed is worth more, the case for permissibility is stronger here than in the preceding case, though weaker than in the first, according to those who distinguish between them. According to Ibn ʿAqīl’s position, transmitted from the early generations, however, all these arrangements are permissible, as we have established, because the transactions are combined.

If he also stipulates that the lessor cultivate a cucumber plot for him, this is like leasing land from someone for cultivation on condition that the lessor till it. He has thus leased his land and contracted with him to provide work. This is permissible, just as one may hire a camel or donkey on condition that its owner transport the hirer’s belongings on it. This combines the hire of a specified asset with a contract to provide work, unless he stipulates that the provider must perform the work himself, in which case he has hired both a specified asset and a specified worker.

If residence is not an intended purpose, and the sole purpose is to purchase fruit in an orchard containing several varieties, with watering being the seller’s responsibility, this is permissible according to al-Layth. It also follows by analogy from the third position that we have mentioned from our fellow jurists and others and have substantiated. The need to combine the two varieties is like the need to combine the sale of fruit with the usufruct, and may be even greater. It may not be possible to sell each variety when it first shows signs of ripening: often this cannot be achieved at all, and sometimes it can be achieved only at the cost of considerable harm.