gratuitous benefit was granted only for the sake of the exchange, not unconditionally. It therefore becomes part of the consideration. If the two parties agree that it is not consideration, they combine two mutually contradictory things.

For someone who lends a man one thousand dirhams and sells him an item worth five hundred for one thousand agrees to lend only because of the inflated price of the item. The buyer, in turn, agrees to pay that inflated price only because of the thousand he has borrowed. Thus, the sale is not truly a sale for one thousand, nor is the loan a pure loan. Rather, the reality is that he has given him one thousand and the item in return for two thousand. This is the case known as “a mudd-measure of ʿajwa dates.” If the purpose is to exchange one thousand for more than one thousand, it is unquestionably forbidden; otherwise, its ruling falls under the well-known scholarly disagreement.

The same applies when someone leases land with a rental value of one hundred for one thousand, while its owner grants him the trees’ fruit free of charge or agrees to receive only one-thousandth of their yield. It is self-evident that the owner granted the fruit only because of the thousand he received, and that the tenant paid the thousand only for the sake of the fruit. The fruit is therefore the principal object of the contract, or part of it. The stratagem is nothing but a form of manipulation and corruption; otherwise, the intended object of the contract is clear.

Those who do not resort to stratagems, or who do so despite having recognized the invalidity of this stratagem, face two alternatives. Either they engage in this transaction out of need, believing that they are doing something forbidden—as we have seen most people do—or they refrain from it and forgo obtaining the fruit covered by this transaction, thereby suffering such harm