Just as a scholar among the Companions, the Successors, or the imams often holds two opinions on a single question at different times, he may likewise hold two opinions concerning a single class of questions at different times. He may give one answer concerning some individual cases at one time, and another answer concerning other cases at another time. If the individual cases are equivalent, yet he has expressed two opinions concerning them, then, if there is no distinction between them that a jurist exercising independent judgment might recognize, there is no disagreement that his position applies uniformly to them. If, however, a jurist might recognize such a distinction, a group of scholars, including Abū al-Khattāb, maintain that the ruling may not be extended from one case to the other.

The majority, including Judge Abū Ya‘lā, maintain that the ruling may be extended, provided that the original scholar does not recognize such a distinction, as indicated by his principles. Some of these scholars extend the ruling whenever they consider the two cases equivalent, even if it is not known whether the original scholar distinguishes between them.

If he distinguishes between individual cases while having both in mind, and the distinction rests on a consideration derived from Islamic law, then that distinction constitutes a position of his. If, however, it rests on ordinary experience, sensory observation, or similar matters about which specialists may know more than jurists who lack firsthand experience, then there is, in reality, no distinction between the two cases under Islamic law. Rather, this is a worldly matter of which the scholar was unaware. Scholars are the heirs of the prophets, and the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said:

“You know best about your worldly affairs. As for matters of your religion, refer them to me.”

Such differences of scholarly opinion concerning the very same question, or the same class of questions, may be called a contradiction