the Sabian philosophers; nor does he affirm matters as do the learned believers devoted to pure monotheism.

His position concerning “the Companions” is similar. Although he acknowledges their integrity in what they transmitted and their knowledge in general, he claims in some places that they did not know the philosophers’ specious arguments or the matters they explored, because he found no transmitted account of the Companions speaking in the philosophers’ terminology. He uses this as an argument in refuting those who claimed . . . (1).

Likewise, such assertions concerning “the Companions” are found only among the most ignorant and unjust of those who speak on scholarly matters: these speculative theologians, would-be philosophers, Shia partisans, and the Ittihādiyya. These assertions resemble the words of many scholars and rulers: “I am braver than they were. They did not fight an enemy like the one we fought, nor engage directly in warfare as we have, nor govern as we have.” Such talk is found only among the most ignorant and unjust kings.

If he means that the Companions did not know the philosophers’ particular expressions and the means by which they explain their intended meanings, this does not detract from them. Messengers and their companions are not required to know the languages of other nations; they are required to know only what is indispensable to conveying the message. The interpreters who mediate between them know each party’s expressions and their meanings. If the two meanings are identical—as with words denoting the sun and the moon—they convey the shared meaning; otherwise, they know where the two meanings coincide and differ, and convey to each party what the other intends. In doing so, they explain the concepts and clarify the identity, similarity, and closeness between the two meanings.