that are foul: lies and unlawful gain. Likewise, those who consume unlawful gain through bribes and the like listen to lies, such as false testimony. This is why He says:

“Why do the godly scholars and rabbis not forbid them from sinful speech and consuming unlawful gain?”

Since these people responded to others besides the Messenger, just as they responded to him when his judgment accorded with their opinions and desires, he was not obliged to judge between them. They chose between accepting his judgment and accepting that of those who opposed him; he therefore had the choice of judging between them or turning away from them. He was obliged to judge only between believers who had no alternative to his judgment.

Once this meaning becomes clear, the decisive answer becomes apparent concerning the obligation to judge between those under covenant from among non-Muslim belligerents—such as those granted safe-conduct, those covered by a truce, and protected non-Muslim subjects. There is a well-known disagreement among scholars on this matter. Some say that it is not obligatory, because he was given a choice. Others say that it is obligatory, and that this choice was abrogated by His words:

“And judge between them according to what Allah has revealed.”

Those holding the first view say: The command here is to judge according to what Allah has revealed if he judges. It therefore concerns how judgment is to be rendered, not whether judgment must be rendered in the first place. It is like His words:

“If you judge, then judge between them with justice,”

and His words:

“And when you judge between people, judge with justice.”

This is the more correct view, for abrogation cannot be established on the basis of a merely possible interpretation, let alone a less likely one.

Another view is that judging is obligatory in cases involving wrongs committed against people, but not in other matters. The disagreement on this is well known within