in relation to oneself as well as to the rights of others—as explained above; I have also written a general discussion earlier in the “Principles” and at the end of the “Draft on Jurisprudence,” explaining that all good deeds fall under justice and all evil deeds fall under wrongdoing—a number of useful points become clear.

Among them is that those who hold authority among the Muslims—scholars, rulers, and those who follow them—each owe people certain duties that constitute the essential obligations of their position, even though these are neither required of nor binding upon those outside that category. These obligations apply to them rather than to those others.

Likewise, certain acts may be forbidden to someone by virtue of his position, even though they are not forbidden to those who do not hold that position, or the prohibition is less severe in their case.

Jihad is an example. It is a collective obligation upon the Muslims generally, and it may sometimes become an individual obligation. However, it is more emphatically obligatory upon soldiers who receive stipends from the fay’ revenues for the purpose of jihad. Indeed, it is an individual obligation upon them: obligatory under religious law; obligatory under the agreement they entered into when they pledged obedience to those in authority regarding jihad; and obligatory by virtue of the compensation they receive.

Even if it were not obligatory under religious law or through a pledge of allegiance to an imam, it would nevertheless become obligatory by virtue of the exchange agreed upon, just as an employee who has received his wages must perform the work, and a seller who has received the price must deliver what he has sold. This obligation arises from the contract of exchange and the receipt of compensation, just as the former is an obligation