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In sum, everyone firmly entrenched in his religious innovation considers his analogical reasoning consistently applicable, since it treats alike what he regards as equivalent—even if this entails repeatedly contradicting the revealed texts.

This occurs both in doctrinal questions concerning revealed reports and in practical questions concerning voluntary acts. A speculative theologian may apply his analogy with unbroken consistency, thus appearing more accomplished than someone who departs from it. Meanwhile, a follower of the Sunnah who shares that analogy may make statements that contradict it in certain cases, sometimes recognizing the inconsistency and sometimes failing to recognize it—the latter being more common. He may also be misled by tenuous distinctions. By undermining his own underlying rationale and distinguishing between cases that are equivalent in that respect, he appears inferior to the first in knowledge, understanding, and consistency in applying his position. Yet this is not so; rather, he is better than the first.

The analogy they shared was unsound from the outset, because it contradicted the revealed text and sound analogy. Thus, the one who applies it consistently is more unsound and inconsistent than the one who departs from it.

This is the situation whenever two people agree upon an analogy that is not actually valid, while one of them has revealed texts that contradict that analogy in certain cases. In many instances, jurists call this istihsān (juristic preference). Thus, those who adopt istihsān by setting aside an analogy in favour of a revealed text are better than those who apply the analogy consistently and set aside the text.