scholars, while others permit him to follow scholarly authority.

Even if these matters fell within their jurisdiction, these men have not followed any of the imams of the Muslims in what they have said, let alone exercised independent juristic reasoning. Rather, they have ruled without either independent juristic reasoning or following scholarly authority. Such a ruling is invalid by consensus, even if it concerned a Jew’s liability for ten specified dirhams. How much more so when they rule against Muslim scholars on general rulings over which, by consensus, they have no jurisdiction!

The sixteenth ground:

Even if they had jurisdiction over these matters and ruled in accordance with the Book, the Sunnah, and scholarly consensus, they would not be entitled to issue a ruling until they had heard the statement and argument of the person against whom they were ruling, given him an opportunity to defend himself, and determined whether he had a response. Scholars hold two views on whether judgment may be issued against an absent party in matters involving rights, such as property claims.

Those who permit judgment against him say: “He retains the right to present his argument, which must be heard when he appears.” As for punishments and prescribed penalties, no judgment may be issued against an absent party. Yet these men have issued such a judgment against an absent person without allowing his statement to be heard or his argument to be presented. Even if this had been done to a Jew, the ruling would have been invalid by consensus. Hence all people of knowledge, religious commitment, and sound judgment condemn such a ruling and know that it is unjust.

The seventeenth ground:

If a judge were someone’s adversary in a dispute over a right, he would not be permitted to rule against his adversary, by the consensus of the Muslims. The same applies to “scholarly questions”: if a judge and another scholar disagree over the interpretation of a verse or