invalid by consensus.

The fourteenth ground:

Only someone who knows the positions of Muslim scholars on these general questions—what they have agreed upon and what they have disputed—and who knows the Book and Sunnah and how to derive evidence from them may speak on these matters. What these people say reveals that they do not know what Muslim scholars have said about these questions, nor distinguish between matters of scholarly consensus and matters of disagreement. They do not know the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, concerning these questions, nor distinguish between what he encouraged and what he forbade and did not prescribe. They do not know the authentic and weak hadiths on this subject. Indeed, they do not even know their own school’s position on these questions, nor do they have any transmitted statements from the four imams or the renowned scholars among their followers supporting what they have said and ruled. Rather, in these matters they are like ordinary students of jurisprudence who ought to seek knowledge of these questions. Indeed, none of them may issue fatwas, engage in debate, or write on these matters, let alone issue judicial rulings.

It is well known that if someone in this position rules on a matter in which he has no authority to rule, his ruling is forbidden by consensus. How much more so if he rules on a matter beyond his authority and rules contrary to consensus! For when a judge rules without either independent juristic reasoning or following scholarly authority, his ruling is forbidden by consensus.

The fifteenth ground:

A judge must be qualified to exercise independent juristic reasoning, according to some