that is valid. In both cases under discussion, he must make up the fast. This is because the sanctity of the month is violated in both cases; indeed, the violation is more serious here, since he already sinned by breaking his fast in the first place. He has thus sinned twice, making the obligation of expiation all the more emphatic.

Moreover, if expiation were not obligatory in such a case, this would provide a means for everyone to evade it. Anyone wishing to have intercourse during Ramadan could simply eat first and then have intercourse. Indeed, eating would help him achieve his purpose. Thus, before eating a meal he would be liable for expiation, but if he and his wife ate and then he had intercourse with her, he would owe no expiation. This is an abhorrent consequence that the Sharia would never prescribe.

For it is firmly established in reason and religion that the greater the sin, the more severe the punishment, and the stronger the resemblance, the stronger the punishment. Expiation combines an element of worship with an element of punishment, and was prescribed both to deter and to erase sin. In every case, therefore, a stronger cause calls for a stronger consequence.

Furthermore, even if breaking the fast by eating is not an independent cause requiring expiation—as Abū Hanīfah and Mālik hold it to be—it should at least reinforce the independent cause; instead,