fasting for a day. If the report is established for them, they act upon it; otherwise, the cautious course is to fast, since that report may be weak. Nevertheless, this question requires further consideration.

There would be grounds for saying that, if the report reaches them during the month, they should rely only on their own sighting, unlike when it reaches them on the first day. Indeed, if a person learns of a sighting by only a few people during the month, it is debatable whether he must make up that day, even if he ends his fast on the basis of that sighting. For the statement,

“Your fasting is on the day you all fast,”

indicates that the earlier day was not a day of fasting for us. Moreover, religious obligation depends on knowledge; where there is neither knowledge nor apparent evidence, there is no obligation. The consistent implication of this is that, if the crescent sighting is established during the day, whether before or after people have eaten, they must complete the day fasting and abstain from whatever breaks the fast, without having to make it up. This is like a child reaching puberty or an insane person regaining sanity, according to the soundest of the three opinions. One opinion requires him both to abstain and to make up the day; another requires neither; and the third requires abstention but not making up the day.

The word hilāl (crescent) is derived from appearing and raising the voice. Thus, if it rises in the sky but does not become known on earth, it has no legal effect, either inwardly or outwardly. Its name is derived from human action: one says ahlalnā al-hilāl and istahlalnāhu. Thus, only a crescent whose sighting is announced constitutes a hilāl. If one or two people sight it but do not report it, it does not constitute a hilāl, and no ruling is established by it until they report it. Their report then constitutes ihlāl, which means raising the voice