Thus, in these matters, although one practice may be preferable to another, whoever follows the less preferable practice has done something permissible. Indeed, following the less preferable practice may become preferable because of an overriding benefit, just as forgoing the preferable practice may sometimes be preferable because of an overriding benefit.

This applies to acts of worship generally: an act belonging to a superior category may, in certain circumstances, be surpassed by another. Prayer as a category is superior to Quran recitation, Quran recitation is superior to remembrance of Allah, and remembrance is superior to supplication. Yet prayer after Fajr and ʿAsr is prohibited, and Quran recitation, remembrance, and supplication are superior to it at those times. Likewise, Quran recitation during bowing and prostration is prohibited, and remembrance in those positions is superior to it. Supplication at the end of the prayer, after the tashahhud, is superior to remembrance.

An otherwise less meritorious act may also be preferable in view of a particular person’s circumstances: he may be unable to perform the superior act, or he may have greater love, desire, and concern for the less meritorious act and derive greater benefit from it. It is then preferable for him because of the greater effort, love, resolve, and benefit accompanying it. Similarly, a sick person may benefit from a medicine he desires more than from one he does not desire, even if the latter belongs to a superior category.

This explains why remembrance may, for some people at certain times, be better than Quran recitation, and Quran recitation may, for others at certain times, be better than prayer, along with other such examples. This is because of the full benefit the person derives from it, not because it belongs to a superior category.