They differed only over whether it is rationally permissible to command such an act. Some even disputed whether something intrinsically impossible—such as combining contraries or contradictories—may rationally be commanded, although no such command occurs in the Shariah. Whoever goes to extremes and claims that obligations of this kind occur in the Shariah—for example, by claiming that Abū Lahab was required to believe that he would not believe—is mistaken in the view of the general body of Muslims across all groups. Rather, if it is supposed that he was told he would suffer in the Fire—which entails his dying in unbelief—and that this declaration was made known to him, then his religious obligation would cease in that circumstance, and faith would no longer benefit him. This would be like the faith of someone who believes only after witnessing the punishment. Allah Most High says:
“But their faith did not benefit them when they saw Our punishment.”
And He says:
“Now? Yet you had disobeyed before and were among the corrupters!”
The purpose here is to point out that disagreement over this principle concerns, at times, the act commanded and, at other times, the permissibility of issuing the command.
This is how some speculative theologians have confused people: they treated the two categories as one and asserted without qualification that obligations beyond one’s capacity are imposed, because certain kinds of obligation occur which the general body of Muslims does not classify as beyond one’s capacity. Disagreement concerning these kinds does not relate to questions of commands and prohibitions, but rather to questions of divine decree and predestination. Such a theologian then treats the permissibility of this category as entailing the permissibility of the category that Muslims agree lies beyond one’s power, drawing an analogy between the two. This is among the “analogies” whose invalidity is acknowledged by all Muslims—indeed, by the adherents of all religions, and even by all rational people. For whoever draws an analogy between a healthy person commanded to perform acts—arguing, for example, that power accompanies the act, or that Allah