the imam’s uprightness, the lawfulness of the pledge of allegiance and similar requirements, when there is a need. Thus, they permitted—and indeed required—performing Friday prayers, the two Eid prayers, prayers in times of fear, pilgrimage rites and the like behind sinful imams and in unlawfully seized places, if refraining would lead to abandoning Friday and congregational prayers, discord within the Muslim community, or similar consequences. As stated in the hadith of Jābir:

“A wicked man must not lead a believer in prayer unless the latter is compelled by a ruler whose sword or whip he fears.”

For, at most, the imam’s uprightness is an obligatory requirement, which is waived when a valid excuse exists, just as many obligations are waived for valid excuses in congregational prayer in times of fear.

Whoever understands this principle—that even the obligations of prayer itself are waived for valid excuses, and likewise the requirements of congregational prayers and similar acts—has been guided to the middle course taught by the Sunnah. This lies between entirely neglecting some obligations of the Sharia, as some people may fall into doing, and insisting so excessively upon a particular obligation that, when unable to fulfil it, one abandons other, more binding obligations despite being able to fulfil them, as others may fall into doing. Fulfilling what one can, rather than what lies beyond one’s ability, is the middle course between these two extremes.

This principle also underlies questions of migration and resolve, which form the basis of “the issue of leadership,” where the action is not performed and capacity is insufficient. Accordingly, Ahmad, in an explicitly reported statement, and a group of his followers held that someone offering an obligatory prayer may, when needed, follow an imam offering a voluntary prayer, as in prayer in times of fear, or when the person offering the obligatory prayer is unable to recite, as in