he would offer the obligatory prayer; for if he were to perform it only under perfect conditions, he would be unable to perform it at all. Performing it with deficiencies is therefore better than abandoning it altogether.

Accordingly, if prayers with specific causes are not performed during the prohibited times, they will be missed and left unperformed, and their benefit will be lost. Unrestricted voluntary prayer is different, since there is ample time to perform it. Refraining from it during the prohibited times fulfils the purpose of the prohibition: preventing resemblance to the polytheists who prostrate to the sun at those times. As explained above, fulfilling this purpose does not require prohibiting every prayer. Rather, prohibiting some prayers achieves it, so prohibiting unrestricted voluntary prayer suffices.

Moreover, prohibiting prayer at those times falls under blocking the means to harm, lest resemblance to the polytheists lead to associating partners with Allah. Whatever is prohibited to block a means to harm, rather than because it is harmful in itself, becomes prescribed when it offers an outweighing benefit. A benefit should not be forfeited unless the harm outweighs it. Prayer offered to Allah at those times is not itself harmful; rather, it is a means that may lead to harm. If the benefit cannot be attained except through that means, it becomes prescribed, and it suffices to [prohibit] it where no such benefit is involved. This is the case with unrestricted voluntary prayer: prohibiting it neither causes harm nor forfeits a benefit, since it can be performed at other times.

This is a principle upheld by Ahmad and others: whatever falls under “blocking the means to harm” is prohibited only when it is not needed. When, however, it is needed to secure a benefit that cannot be attained except through it, it may nevertheless be prohibited. Hence, in contracts, a distinction is drawn between legal stratagems and blocking the means to harm: the person employing a stratagem