by consensus. It is therefore impermissible to exclude prayer leaders from its scope. The hadith of Ibn Mas‘ūd covers the same cases as the hadith of Abū Sa‘īd. Thus, only the third possibility remains:

Both address the person who is in doubt. One commands him to exercise his judgment, if he can, thereby dispelling his doubt; the other tells him what to do if his doubt persists.

This is like telling a judge, “Rule on the basis of evidence,” or “Rule on the basis of witnesses,” and similar instructions. This applies when such evidence is available. If it is unavailable, he falls back on the presumption of continuity—namely, the presumption of freedom from liability.

Likewise, a person who doubts during prayer acts on whatever makes the correct course clear to him. If that is not possible, he falls back on the presumption of continuity. And Allah knows best.

Furthermore, acting on one’s considered judgment puts an end to Satan’s whisperings or reduces them. Without exercising his judgment, however, a person remains subject to Satan’s attempts to make him doubt whether he has performed what he has actually performed.

They have also said that if, after the closing salutation, a person doubts whether he omitted an obligatory act, he should disregard that doubt. This is only because he apparently gave the salutation after completing the prayer. Thus, what is apparently the case takes precedence over the presumption of continuity. This principle underlies most matters of religious law. The same applies to counting circuits around the Kaaba, passages between Safā and Marwah, stones thrown at the stoning sites, and similar acts.

What further clarifies this is that relying solely on the presumption that a prior state of nonexistence continues is the weakest of all proofs; even the slightest evidence outweighs it, as with the presumption of freedom from liability