to the point of denying the clear implications and indications of the wording. An example is the Most High’s saying:

“Do not say to them so much as a word of irritation.”

They said that this indicates only a prohibition on expressing irritation; no prohibition on striking or insulting them can be understood from it. They also rejected “isolating the effective cause” and claimed apparent meanings for words that those words do not convey. Others sometimes give analogy precedence because the text’s indication is incomplete, or because it is a solitary report. Still others set the text and analogy against one another and give precedence to the text, yet fall into inconsistency.

We have explained elsewhere that sound proofs do not contradict one another. Sound rational and scriptural proofs do not conflict, nor does a sound inference from analogy contradict a sound inference from the wording. Sound analogy is, in essence, treating like cases alike. This is the justice with which Allah sent down the Book and sent the messengers. The Messenger does not command anything contrary to justice, nor does he give different rulings for two equivalent cases; nor can one thing be forbidden while its equivalent is lawful.

We have examined most of the cases in which analogy is said to conflict with the text, and the text’s ruling is said to run contrary to analogy. We have found that whenever the Lawgiver singles something out for a ruling different from that of comparable cases, He does so only because it possesses a distinctive attribute that requires this particular ruling. Such is the special concession for arāyā sales, permitting dates on the palm to be sold for their estimated equivalent in dried dates, because measuring them by volume is impracticable despite