their discourse, through its sheer volume, comes to be regarded—by the ignorant—as equal to that of the people of knowledge and the Sunnah. The matter may then become unclear to the ruler responsible for these people, who will need someone to present Allah’s proof and explain it, so that punishment follows the establishment of that proof. Punishment before the proof has been established is not lawful. Allah Most High says:

“And We never punish until We have sent a messenger.”

For this reason, the jurists have stated concerning rebels that the ruler should correspond with them: if they raise a doubt, he should clarify it; and if they complain of an injustice, he should remove it. Thus Alī sent Ibn Abbās to the Khawārij, and he debated with them until four thousand of them abandoned their position. Likewise, Umar ibn Abd al-Azīz summoned the advocates of the Qadariyyah and the Khawārij and debated with them until the truth became clear to them and they acknowledged it. After his death, however, Ghaylān al-Qadarī went back on his repentance and was crucified.

As for a ruler compelling adherence to a position in disputed matters without evidence from the Quran and Sunnah, this is impermissible by the agreement of the Muslims. A judge’s ruling that one position rather than another is correct in such matters carries no weight unless he has evidence that must be followed. In that case, his words carry the same weight before and after his appointment to office, just like the scholarly books he writes. Certainly, holding office may enable him to proclaim a truth and disseminate knowledge that he had previously been unable to spread. But the question of ability or inability is distinct from that of having or lacking the right to do something.

A judge may, however, establish what Zayd or Amr has said. If that statement relates specifically to the individual concerned, it falls within the matters over which judges have jurisdiction,