to those who possess knowledge of these matters and fear Allah in addressing them. If the sultan or judge has these qualifications, he may speak on such matters in that capacity. When a judge is removed from office, he does not lose his entitlement to undertake such activities as issuing fatwas and the like; speaking on these matters is not restricted to those holding office. If the sultan or judge possesses neither knowledge of these matters nor the requisite fear of Allah, he may not lawfully speak on them, let alone sit in judgment on them. Ibn Makhlūf possesses neither knowledge of these matters nor the requisite fear of Allah.”

I said: “As for Judge Badr al-Dīn—Allah forbid! His virtue and religious devotion would prevent him from participating in this ruling, which contravenes the consensus of the Muslims in twenty-odd respects.”

I said: “Whoever persists in maintaining that this ruling issued by Ibn Makhlūf is a ruling according to the law of Muhammad is an unbeliever once the proof has been established against him. Even Muslim children know, as a self-evident part of the religion of Islam, that neither Jews nor Christians would accept this ruling, let alone Muslims.”

I mentioned to him some of the grounds that demonstrate the invalidity of this ruling. They have been written down and are in the possession of “al-Sharaf Muhammad.” Likewise, I cleared Judge “Shams al-Dīn al-Sarūjī” of any involvement in such a ruling. I told him: “Your aim was not to issue a ruling according to Islamic law; rather, your aim was only to counter