He does not will them.” Sometimes they also say, “Nor does He love or approve of them unless they actually occur.” They say, “Yet He commands and calls for them.”

They were asked, “Can there be a demand, a will, and a call without will, love, or approval? This combines two contradictories.” They were confounded. Thus, the former stripped the Lord of His act of creation, His power, and His all-encompassing will; the latter stripped Him of His love, His approval, His prescriptive will, and what His commands and prohibitions entail in this regard.

Just as those discussed earlier did not acknowledge that one and the same person could be both rewarded and punished, but held that he must be either rewarded or punished, so these groups did not acknowledge that one and the same act could be willed in one respect but not another—willed without being loved. Rather, they held that it must be either both willed and loved, or neither willed nor loved.

Just as they differed concerning the Creator’s attributes, they differed concerning the attributes of created beings. The former affirmed only one capacity, existing before the act, while the latter affirmed for the creature only one capacity, existing alongside the act. The former denied the effective capacity by which an act occurs; the latter denied the capacity relevant to religious obligation, on the basis of which Allah commands and forbids His servant. This is one of the fundamental grounds of their disagreement over “the question of imposing obligations beyond one’s capacity.”

They divided into the Magian Qadariyyah, who affirm divine commands and prohibitions but deny divine determination and decree; the polytheistic Qadariyyah, who are worse than the former, affirm divine determination and decree but reject divine commands and prohibitions, or some of them; and the satanic Qadariyyah, who acknowledge the command but regard this as a contradiction contrary to truth and wisdom. And this is