and liability for the lives and property he deemed lawful to take on the basis of an interpretation, just as Usāmah deemed it lawful to kill the man he killed after the latter had said, “There is no deity worthy of worship except Allah.” Likewise, he is not punished for past conduct when doing so would not deter future misconduct.

As for punishment intended to prevent future wrongdoing, such as fighting a rebel or flogging someone who drinks intoxicants, its purpose is to ensure that obligations are fulfilled and prohibited acts prevented in the future. This is not in question, for in such circumstances it is prescribed, in certain cases, to punish someone acting on an interpretation.

The issue concerns matters relating to the past: making up missed obligations, relinquishing rights acquired during that time, and punishment for what one has done. In these matters—prescribed punishments, rights, and acts of worship—a Muslim acting on an interpretation must be treated more favorably than an unbeliever acting on an interpretation, and is more entitled to such treatment. Repentance wipes away what came before it. The Muslim acting on an interpretation is excused; moreover, he has Islam, through which sins are forgiven, and repentance, which wipes away what preceded it.

Requiring him to make up missed obligations, forfeit rights, and undergo punishments discourages repentance and a return to the truth more than imposing these requirements on an unbeliever would discourage him. For the exposition of Islam and the evidence for it are more compelling than the exposition of these subsidiary rulings and their proofs. The incentive to embrace Islam arising from the force of proof and power may also be greater than the incentive to follow these subsidiary rulings.