a former unbeliever concerning the truth of Islam. We allow his existing marriage contract to stand and permit him to retain what he received under an invalid contract, provided that the invalidating circumstance no longer exists. This is even more justified than allowing unbelievers, after embracing Islam, to remain in marriages that were prohibited under Islam. Performing obligations and refraining from prohibitions are governed by the same principle, as explained earlier regarding the unbeliever.

This is clear: pardoning a Muslim who acted on an interpretation and allowing his prior arrangements to stand after he abandons that interpretation is more justified than doing so for an unbeliever who acted on an interpretation. Nevertheless, there is disagreement over this within the school and elsewhere. The flaw in the opposing argument lies in focusing on the fact that this is prohibited and that prohibition entails invalidity, while treating all Muslims as one category without distinguishing between those acting on an interpretation and others.

An analogous issue is whether rebels acting on an interpretation are liable for the lives they take and the property they destroy among those on the side of justice. There are two reported opinions.

The first is that they are liable, treating them like armed outlaws and like those who fight out of factional partisanship without relying on an interpretation. This parallels the position of those who treat contracts entered into and assets received on the basis of an interpretation in the same way as those involving no such interpretation.

The second is that they are not liable. The early generations agreed on this, as al-Zuhrī said:

“Civil strife broke out while the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) were still present in great numbers, and they unanimously agreed