Majmu' al-Fatawa - Ibn Taimiya - (22/12)

Majmu' al-FatawaIbn Taimiya

for omitting them because of his independent juristic reasoning, his following another scholar, or his excusable ignorance, is all the more fitting and appropriate. Just as Islam wipes away what came before it, repentance wipes away what came before it—especially the repentance of someone who had a valid excuse and then received or understood the text, having previously been unable to hear and understand it. This is abundantly clear. The same applies to contracts he concluded and assets he received without knowing that they were prohibited, owing to excusable ignorance or an interpretation. According to one of the two views, the same ruling applies to him in these matters, with even greater justification.

Thus, if someone enters into a transaction that he believes permissible on the basis of an interpretation—whether involving usury, gambling, the price of wine, an invalid marriage, or something else—and then the truth becomes clear to him and he repents, or he brings his case before us for judgment, or seeks a legal ruling from us, he is allowed to retain what he has received under these contracts. His marriage is also allowed to stand if its invalidating circumstance has ceased to exist. For example, he may have married without a guardian or without witnesses, believing this permissible; married a fifth wife during the fourth wife’s waiting period; entered into a disputed form of marriage intended to make a woman lawful again for her former husband; or done something similar. Even if he subsequently discovers that the marriage was invalid, it is allowed to stand.

If, however, he married on the basis of independent juristic reasoning and subsequently concluded, through independent juristic reasoning, that the marriage was invalid, this rests on the principle that one juristic judgment is not overturned by another, whether in adjudication or in issuing legal opinions. That is a separate basis for the ruling. Our point here, however, concerns the case in which he becomes certain of the prohibition through a definitive text, with a certainty like that of

عَلَى التَّرْكِ لِاجْتِهَادِهِ، أَوْ تَقْلِيدِهِ، أَوْ جَهْلِهِ الَّذِي يُعْذَرُ بِهِ أَوْلَى وَأَحْرَى. وَكَمَا أَنَّ الْإِسْلَامَ يَجُبُّ مَا كَانَ قَبْلَهُ، فَالتَّوْبَةُ تَجُبُّ مَا كَانَ قَبْلَهَا، لَا سِيَّمَا تَوْبَةُ الْمَعْذُورِ الَّذِي بَلَغَهُ النَّصُّ، أَوْ فَهِمَهُ بَعْدَ إنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ تَمَكَّنَ مِنْ سَمِعَهُ وَفَهِمَهُ، وَهَذَا ظَاهِرٌ جِدًّا إلَى الْغَايَةِ. وَكَذَلِكَ مَا فَعَلَهُ من الْعُقُودِ والقبوض الَّتِي لَمْ يَبْلُغْهُ تَحْرِيمَهَا لِجَهْلِ يُعْذَرُ بِهِ، أَوْ تَأْوِيلٍ. فَعَلَى إحْدَى الْقَوْلَيْنِ حُكْمُهُ فِيهَا هَذَا الْحُكْمُ وَأَوْلَى. فَإِذَا عَامَلَ مُعَامَلَةً يَعْتَقِدُ جَوَازَهَا بِتَأْوِيلِ: مِنْ رِبًا، أَوْ مَيْسِرٍ، أَوْ ثَمَنِ خَمْرٍ، أَوْ نِكَاحٍ فَاسِدٍ، أَوْ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ، ثُمَّ تَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْحَقُّ وَتَابَ، أَوْ تَحَاكَمَ إلَيْنَا، أَوْ اسْتَفْتَانَا، فَإِنَّهُ يُقَرُّ عَلَى مَا قَبَضَهُ بِهَذِهِ الْعُقُودِ، وَيُقَرُّ عَلَى النِّكَاح الَّذِي مَضَى مُفْسِدُهُ، مِثْلَ أَنْ يَكُونَ قَدْ تَزَوَّجَ بِلَا وَلِيٍّ أَوْ بِلَا شُهُودٍ مُعْتَقِدًا جَوَازَ ذَلِكَ، أَوْ نَكَحَ الْخَامِسَةَ فِي عِدَّةِ الرَّابِعَةِ، أَوْ نِكَاحَ تَحْلِيلٍ مُخْتَلَفٍ فِيهِ، أَوْ غَيْرَ ذَلِكَ، فَإِنَّهُ وَإِنْ تَبَيَّنَ لَهُ فِيمَا بَعْدُ فَسَادَ النِّكَاحِ، فَإِنَّهُ يُقَرُّ عَلَيْهِ. أَمَا إذَا كَانَ نَكَحَ بِاجْتِهَادٍ وَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْفَسَادُ بِاجْتِهَادِ فَهَذَا مَبْنِيٌّ عَلَى أَنَّ الِاجْتِهَادَ لَا يُنْقَضُ بِالِاجْتِهَادِ، لَا فِي الْحُكْمِ وَلَا فِي الْفُتْيَا أَيْضًا، فَهَذَا مَأْخَذٌ آخَرُ. وَإِنَّمَا الْغَرَضُ هُنَا أَنَّهُ لَوْ تَيَقَّنَ التَّحْرِيمَ بِالنَّصِّ الْقَاطِعِ. كَتَيَقُّنِ