through contact with impurity, and said that, on this view, it must also be possible to remove impurity with it. This is because, if it repels impurity from itself, it also repels it from other things, as they have argued concerning water. According to this position, it therefore follows that impurity may be removed with any pure liquid capable of removing its substance and eliminating its traces. This is what analogical reasoning requires, and we therefore accept it on this assumption.

If, on the other hand, repelling impurity from itself does not entail repelling it from other things, because transformation is more effective than removal, then anyone who holds that impurity may be removed with liquids other than water must accord those liquids the same ruling as water. Thus, if the correct ruling concerning water is that it becomes impure only when its properties change—whether regardless of quantity or when present in large quantities—then the same is the correct ruling concerning other liquids.

In short, water and other liquids can be treated alike under either assumption. This is what the revealed texts and analogical reasoning require, both regarding the removal of impurities and regarding their contact with liquids, whether water or otherwise. Whoever reflects on the fundamental principles established by the revealed texts and agreed upon, and on the considerations recognized by the Sacred Law in its rulings, will see that this is the most correct position. Deeming water and other liquids impure without any change in their properties is far removed from the apparent meanings of the texts and from analogical reasoning. Likewise, maintaining that the ruling of impurity remains attached to affected places after the impurity has been removed with a liquid or something else is far removed from those fundamental principles and the requirements of analogy. Whoever is a jurist well versed in the grounds of the rulings of the Sacred Law and sets aside personal bias