that accords with the position of the early generations. I would also explain that the view attributed to him concerning the figurative interpretation of the attributes known through revelation has no basis in his own statements; it is merely the view of a group of his followers. Thus, the Ash'arīs have two positions; al-Ash'arī himself does not.

When, during the gathering, I mentioned that all the names of Allah also applied to created beings are like the term “existence”—which, according to all three views, is predicated literally of both the Necessary Being and contingent beings—two senior scholars disputed whether it is predicated equivocally or univocally.

One said, “It is univocal.” The other said, “It is equivocal, so as not to entail composition.”

The latter added, “Fakhr al-Dīn has stated that this dispute rests on whether a thing’s existence is identical with its essence. Those who say that the existence of every thing is identical with its essence hold that the term is predicated equivocally, whereas those who say that its existence is something additional to its essence hold that it is predicated univocally.”

The first then began arguing in favour of the view that existence is additional to essence, in order to defend its univocal predication.

The second said, “It is not the position of al-Ash'arī and Ahl al-Sunnah that a thing’s existence is identical with its essence.” The first rejected this.

I said, “As for the speculative theologians of Ahl al-Sunnah, they hold that the existence of every thing is identical with its essence;