ablution, and then an obligatory duty arose that prevented him from completing it—such as rescuing someone from drowning or enjoining right and forbidding wrong—and he discharged that duty, he could then complete his ablution, just as with circumambulation, and with even greater reason. The same applies if an illness were to prevent him from completing his ablution. Moreover, the principles of the Sharia distinguish throughout between those who are able and those who are unable, and between those who are negligent or transgress the limits and those who are neither negligent nor transgressive. Distinguishing between them is a fundamental, authoritative principle. It is the middle course followed by the balanced community, and through it the just position between two divergent views becomes clear.

I have examined as many questions as Allah has willed in which the opposing positions diverge between denial and affirmation, until they resemble questions of sectarian controversy and opinions to which factions cling. These include questions discussed in the various approaches to the disagreements between Abū Hanīfah and al-Shāfi'ī, and among the four imams, as well as other questions.

I have found that, in many of them, the correct position lies in the middle. Examples include removing ritual impurity with something other than water; issuing judgment on the basis of a refusal to take an oath; paying equivalent values in zakat; praying at the beginning of the prescribed time; reciting behind the imam; specifying one’s intention and forming it during the night; selling goods that are not present; avoiding ritual impurity during prayer; questions of partnership, such as labor partnerships, credit partnerships, and mufāwadah partnerships; and the qualifications of a judge. This is likewise the authoritative principle in matters of transmitted doctrine and belief, which are called